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ABSTRACT 
Noncompliance with tax laws and other forms of criminal activity have 
typically been treated as equivalent; both have been modeled in decision­
theoretic terms, with the same probability of detection applying to all 
agents. However, noncompliance with tax laws is different from other criminal 
activities because taxpayers are required to submit a preliminary accounting 
of their behavior, while potential criminals obviously are not. This 
preliminary round of information transmission differentiates individuals, and 
raises the possibility that it may not be optimal to apply the same 
probability of detection to all taxpayers. 
We develop a game-theoretic model of income tax compliance in which 
the taxpayer possesses private information about his own income, while the IRS 
knows only the probability distribution according to which the taxpayer's 
income is realized. By investing effort, the IRS can (stochastically) verify 
a taxpayer's income. We characterize the sequential equilibrium for this 
game, which consists of a reporting rule for the individual taxpayer, and a 
verification policy for the IRS. 
Our equilibrium has the feature that taxpayers with greater true 
income under-report less than those with lower true income, and efforts at 
verification are lower the greater is reported income. If individuals can be 
classified on the basis of some observable characteristic which is related to 
opportunities for income, we find that classes of taxpayers who enjoy greater 
opportunities for high income under-report to a greater extent; accordingly, 
more effort is devoted to their investigation. This is to be distinguished 
from the former result, which applies to different types of taxpayers within 
the same class. 
SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM VERIFICATION AND REPORTING POLICIES 
IN A MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE*
Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L .  Wilde 
I_,_ Int roduc tion 
There is a substantial literature devoted to tax compl iance and , more 
general ly, to the economics of crime and punishment. These problems have 
typically been treated as equivalent; they have bo th been  modeled as por tfolio 
probl ems. in which an agent must  al loca te his  budget ( of  income , or effor t) 
between the risky asset ( unrepor ted income, or criminal activi ty) and the 
risk-free asset ( repor ted income, or legal activity) (see e.g . , A l lingham and 
Sand mo. 197 2; Becl<er ,  1968; Pol in sky and Shavel l, 1979; Srinivasan, 197 3 ;  and 
Stigler , 1970). Each of these analyses assumes a fixed probabil i ty that 
proscribed behavior will be de tected. al though some attention has been. given 
to the de terminatio n of the optimal probability of de tection. More recently , 
there have been repeated-games analyses of these problems ( Landsberger and 
Meil ijson. 1982; Greenberg , 1984; and Rubinstein ,  1979) , but again these 
models are equal ly applicable to tax compliance and other criminal activity. 
We consider the problem of tax compliance to be fundamental ly 
different from that of other criminal ac t ivities because taxpayers are 
required to submi t a preliminary accounting of their behavior, while  potential 
criminal s obviously face no such requirement. This  prel iminary round of 
information trans�ission wil l tend to differentiate individual s ,  and raises 
the possibility that it may not be optimal to apply  the same verification 
policy to al l taxpayers. In this paper, we incorporate the information 
content of the income r·eporti n g  process into an equilibrium model of tax 
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compl iance and enforcement. 
To this end , we assume the taxpayer possesses private information 
about his own income level , while  the IRS knows only the probabil ity 
distribution according to which the taxpayer's income is realized. By 
invest ing resources ,  the IRS can ( perhaps only stochastical ly) verify the 
taxpayer's income. We assume the cost of verifica tion is  dependent upon the 
probability of verification chosen by the IRS. We seek to characterize the 
optimal reporting rule for an i ndividual taxpayer, given his private 
information, and given the verification policy of the IRS. Similarly ,  we wish 
to charac terize the optimal verification pol icy of the IRS , given the 
repor ting behavior of taxpayers , and given its incomplete information 
regarding the taxpayer's true income . 
Our approach to this problem represents an appl ication of the 
sequential equilibrium solution  concept (Kreps and Wil son, 1982a). This 
methodology has yielded interest i ng resul ts  when appl ied to problems in limit 
pric i ng (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a; Matthews and Mirman, 1983; and Sal oner , 
1983) , reputation and predation ( Kreps and Wil son, 1982b; Milgrom and Roberts. 
1982b) , bargaining (Fudenberg and Tirole , 1983; and Cramton , 1984), signalling 
( Spence, 1974; Kreps , 1984; Milgrom and Roberts , 1984) and convertible debt 
cal l pol icy (Harris and Raviv , 1984). Other recent anal yses of rel ated 
problems can be found i n  Baron and Besanko ( 1983), Reinganum and Wilde 
(forthcoming) and Townsend (1979). These three papers do not use the 
sequential equil i brium approach adopted here ; instead they employ a 
principal-agent structure to examine the problem of opt imal audi ting. 
In Section  II we set up our basic  game-theoretic model of tax 
compliance, and examine necessary condi tions for equilibrium. Two candidates
for equilibrium are identified and charac terized. In Section III we veri fy 
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that one candidate ac tual ly does constitute a sequential equilibrium for the 
game described in Sec tion II , and we rule out the other candidate . This 
equil ibrium has the feature that taxpayers with  greater true income under­
repor t  less than those with lower true income, and efforts  at verification are 
l ower the greater is repor ted income. In Sec tion IV we present  an algebraic 
example . In Section V we use a comparative static analysis to examine the 
impac t of separating taxpayers into c lasses on  the basis of some 
characteristic which is di rectly  observable. We find that classes of 
taxpayers who enjoy greater opportunities for high income under-report  to a 
greater extent; accordingly, more effort is devoted to their de tection . This 
is to be distinguished from the former resul t ,  which appl ies to different 
types of taxpayers within  the same clas s .  I n  Section V I  w e  consider the 
impac t of declining verification  cost s  upon the equilibrium verification and 
repor ting policies . Section  VII reconsiders the analysis of Section II under 
the assumption that taxpayers are risk averse . Section VIII concludes and
suggests possibil i ties for future research . 
lL_ The Model
The timing of moves in the model are as fol lows: the taxpayer 
observes his true income ; we wil l often refer to the taxpayer's true income as 
the taxpayer's "type ." Based upon true i ncome , the taxpayer conveys  a 
sta tement of repor�9 income to the IRS. Since the IRS does no t  observe the 
taxpayer 's true income, i t  must  make some conjecture about the type of 
taxpayer who would repor t a giv en level of income . Based on the level of 
income r epor ted and these conjec tures , the IRS chooses a level of effort  to be 
devoted to investigating the taxpayer . This effor t wil l be assumed to  
gener ate a par ticular pr obability th at the  taxpayer's true income will be
verified, with the proper ty that gr eater effor t leads to a greater probabili ty 
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of verification . Thus investiga tion does not imply certain apprehension. 
Suppose that true ( taxable) income for the taxpayer is a random 
variable I e [1 ,Il , where 1 <I<=. with distribution function F(.) . Let x
denote repor ted income for a taxpayer. A strategy for the taxpayer is a
reporting policy x = r ( I) , where r : [I . Il 4 (-®,=); that is . the taxpayer may 
report  any level of income , not just  those which migh t possibly occur . If the 
taxpayer is not i nvestigated, then he is asked to pay a tax of tx dol lars ; 
that is , we assume proportional taxation. If the taxpayer is investigated and 
his true income is ascertained , then a tax plus a fine propor tional to evaded 
tax is assessed: if I is the taxpayer's true income , this  amount is
tI + t n(I-x) . Note  that no feasibility restrictions are placed on the tax 
assessments; individuals who report  negative income and are not investigated 
receive a transfer (or negative income tax) , and taxpayers whose payment 
exceeds their  income due to over-reporting or a fine are bound by their 
reports. and hence suffer negative i ncome. 
Given the taxpayer's report, the IRS must  choose a level of effor t to 
devote  to investigatio n .  Since this effort yields a probability of 
verification which is monotonical ly increasing in effor t , we can treat the IRS 
as choosing a probability of verification ,  with an associated effort  cost . 
Let p denote the probability of verification . A strat!l&}'. for the IRS is a
verification  pol icy p = p ( x) ,  where p:(-=,=) 4 [0 ,1] .  Since any report is 
permissible ,  the verification pol icy must be defined for any possible report. 
Let c(p) denote the cost to  the IRS of sustaining probability p of 
verificatio n .  We assume that c ( O) = 0 ,  and that c( .) is twice continuously 
differentiable for p e [0 , 1) and satisfies the fol lowing restrictions: for 
p e [0, 1) , 
(Al) 0 < c • ( p ) < = and 0 ( c " ( p ) < ® 
( A2 ) lim c ' C p) 
p-H 
ro. and 
(A3 ) c'(p)/c"(p ) + p > 1/(1 + n). 
Restriction (A3) is a curvature condi tion which ensures that the 
marginal cost of verification  does not rise too quickly .  The point at which 
this restriction is subsequently used wil l be emphasized . 
Fina l ly , since the IRS does not observe I directly, it must form 
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bel iefs or conjectures which relate reports to types of taxpayers . Let µCdlxl 
denote the IRS' prior probabi l i ty assessment that the true type of a taxpayer 
who reports x belongs to the set <I 5; II.I] . We require that µ ( [1.Il Ix) = 1; 
that is, the IRS's beliefs cannot assign to any report a taxpayer type which 
is known to be nonexistent.
Throughout this section we assume that bo th the IRS and the taxpayer 
are risk-neutral , and maximize expected net revenue and expected net income, 
respect ively . Risk aversion on the part of taxpayers is considered i n  Sect ion  
VII. Expected net revenue to the  IRS when it observes a report of  x and
chooses a probabil ity p of verifica tion, conditional  upon its bel iefs µ ( <lixl , 
is 
R ( x.p;µ) = p[tE nix) + nt ( E Olxl - x)] + (1 - p) tx - c ( p) ,µ µ 
where E <Ilxl represents the expected value of the taxpayer's income , given
,, 
that he reported income x, based upon the IRS' prior probability assessement 
µ; that is, E <Ilx> 
µ f Idµ<Ilxl .
CI.II 
Expected net income to a taxpayer who has true income I and reports 
income x. condi tional upon the verifica tion policy p( .) , is 
NO,x;p) p(x)[I - tI - trr(I - x)] + (1 - p ( x) )(I - tx).
Note that the taxpayer bears no costs when bei ng i nvestiga ted, suffering a 
penalty  only if noncompliance is ascertai ned. The functions R ( x,p;µ) and 
N ( l, x;p) represent the I@Y!?ff§ to the IRS and the taxpayer, respectively .
Definit ion 1 .  A triple (µ(di.) ,p( .) .�( . ) )  i s  a sequential eg!JJlJQrium if
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( a) Given the beliefs µ<di.>. p ( x) maximizes R (x.p;µ) ( sequential rationa l ity); 
( b) Given the verification  policy p ( .) , r ( I) maximizes N ( I , x;p) ; and 
( c) µCdlxl = µF ( d  n;; 
-l ( x)) /µF ( ;; 
-l ( x))  for all  <I£" [1 .Il .
where µF(d) = fdF (I) ( consistency) .ij 
This definition admits the possibil ity  of � eguil iQria, in which
-1 r ( x) is set-valued . However. we wil l be speci fically  interested in a
separating equilibrium, in which r ( I) is monotonica l ly increasi ng; in this 
- 1  case, r ( x) is single-valued. Consequently, we define separa ti.!Jg bel ief§, 
which assign a unique taxpayer type to each report x .  Let �:(-ro,ro) � [1.Il 
denote these beliefs. Given the beliefs � ( .) , we can rewrite the expected net 
revenue to the IRS as fol lows . 
R ( x, p;d p [tdx) + nt!dx) - x)] + (1 - p) tx - c ( p) .
Definition 2 .  A triple ( � ( .) , p ( .) , r ( .) ) i s  a separa1i!!g seguen�i!'l 
�ilj.!Jd!l!!l if 
( a) Given the bel iefs � ( x) ,  p ( x) maximizes RCx.p;� ) ( sequential rationa l i ty);
( b) Given the  verification  pol icy p ( x) ,  r ( I) maximizes N (I.x;p); and 
( cl � ( r ( I) )  I for al l I e [1.Il (consistency) . 
Alternatively , a consistency condition equivalent to ( c )  is 
- -1 - - -'t ( x) = r (x) for al l x e [r ( IJ ,r ( l)]. 
Necessary Conditions for a Separating Equilibrium 
The IRS maximizes R (x . p;'t) by a choice of p 
optimization requires that 
p ( x) .  Pointwise 
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RP(x,p(x);'t) = t ( l  + n)('t(x) - x) - c' ( p ( x))  2 O (� 0) and p ( x) � 1 (2 0) . ( 1)
When p(x) is interior . the necessary condition is
R
P
(x , p ( x);'t) = t ( l  + n) ('t ( x) - x) - c' ( p ( x)) o. ( l') 
Since c'' ( p) > O for al l p ,  equation ( 1) is necessary and sufficient to
determine the optimal verification pol icy p ( x) ( given 't ( x) ),  
The taJCpayer maximizes NCI . x;p) by a choice of x = r ( I) .  If p ( .) is 
differentiable, then the optimal report ( given p ( x) J  solves 
Nx(I.r(I) ;p) p' ( r (I)J [-t ( l  + n) ( I  r (l) ) ]
+ p ( r(I) ) tn - t ( l  - p ( r (I) ) )  o. ( 2) 
If p( .) is twice differentiable , the n  a second-order necessary condition is 
Nxx(I,r(!);p) = p'' ( r ( I) ) [-t ( l + n)(I - r(I) ) ]  + 2p' ( r ( I) ) t ( l + n) � o. ( 3 )  
Equations (1) , ( 2) and (3 ) hold simultaneously at a sequential 
equilibrium. t
'
ncorporating the co nsistency condition that I = 't ( X) = r-1 ( x), 
we can re-write equations (1'), (2) and (3 ) as fol lows:
t(l + n)(r-1Cxl - x) - c'(p(x)) o. ( 4) 
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p' ( x) [-t ( l  + n)(r-1 ( x) - x)) + p(x)tn - t(l - p(x)) o. ( S) 
p " ( x) [-t ( l  + n) ( r-1 ( x) - x)] + 2p' ( x) t(l + n) � o. (6) 
Equations ( 4) and ( S I  can be combined to give equation (7) bel ow , an ordinary
differential equation: 
-p' ( x)c' ( p ( x)) + tnp ( x) - t ( l - p(x)) = 0 .
The ordinary differential equation (7) has two kinds of solutions.
First , there  is  a one-parameter family of solutions, p0 ( ,) , in which p0(x) 
depends non-trivial ly on x. We can rewrite (7) as fol lows:
p. [tnp - t ( l  - p)J/c' ( p)
( 7) 
The expression [tnp - t(l - pll/c'(p) is conti nuously differentiable in p o n  
[0,1) under assumption ( Al) . I t  then fol lows that for any given boundary 
condition p0 ( a) = b ,  where a £ ( -m,m ) and b £ [0 , 1) ,  a unique solution p0(x) 
to (7) exists ( at least in a neighborhood of x = al .  Moreover, p0 ( x) wil l  be
twice differentiable  ( Hestenes, p .  49 ,  Theorem 1 4 .1).  Second , because 
equation (7) is nonlinear , there is also a singular solution p(x ) = 1/ ( 1  + n), 
in which the verification policy is independent of reported income. The 
-1 -1 -solutions p0(,) and p(.) imply ( inverse) reporti ng pol icies r0 ( ,) and r ( .) , 
respectively ,  which can be obtai ned by sol ving equation ( 4). Final ly, we need 
to add appropriate bel iefs. Consi stency requires that 't0(x) r �1Cx) for
x e [r ( I) , r  ( J) ]; the "natural" beliefs associated with p ( x) for reports0 - 0 0 
outside the range of those which would  be reported in equilibrium by any 
existing type are: 't0 ( x) = I for x > r0(J), and T0(x) = l for x < r0 ( J) .  (The
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natural bel iefs associated with p(x) are analogously derived.) These bel iefs 
assign the neares t type to reports which lie  outside the range of equilibrium 
reports which would be made by any exist i ng type of taxpayer. We wil l  refer 
to a sol ution of equation ( 7), al ong w i th its  associated reporting policy and
bel iefs, as a candJ9�1� for equilibrium if it also satisfies equation (6) ; 
that is, if the second-order necessary condi tion for the taxpayer's  optimum is 
satisfied. 
Note that equation ( 7) is merel y suggestive of candidates for a
sequential equilibrium; these candidates must  be verified, modified or 
eliminated by checking whether the implied verification and reporti ng pol icies 
ac tual ly are best against each other. 
Consider the triple ( �0.p0,r0). Because p0 ( x) is  twice
differentiable, r-1 ( x) will  al so be differentiable. By construction , the pai r0 
( p  ,r-1> satisfy equations ( 4) and (5) for al l x. Equations (4) and (5) can0 0 
be differentiated to obtain: 
and 
t(l + 11)(r--1·cx) - 1) - c" ( p ) p  ' ( x)0 0 0 0 
p "(xl[-t{l + n) ( r
-1Cx) - x)] + 2p ' ( x) t ( l + 11)0 0 0 
- p ' ( x) t ( l + 11) r-1'!xl0 0 o. 
Lemma 1_,_ If ( p0 ( x) , r�1 ( x))  satisfies
-1 
(6) with a strict  i nequal i ty, then 
Po• (x) 0 and r ' ( x) e (0 , 1) . 0 
{ 8)  
( 9) 
froof. From equation ( 8), ei ther (i) p ' ( x) > O and r-1·<xl - 1 > 0, or ( ii)0 0 
p '(x) < O and r-l, ( x) - 1 < O. From equation (9) and assuming that0 0 
inequality (6) is strict, either (Hi} p0'(x) > O and r�1 •( x} 0 or (iv)
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p ' ( x) < O and r-1• ( x) > 0. Since ( i) and (iii) are mutually inconsis tent, i t0 0 
fol lows that ( i i) and ( iv) hold. That is , -1 P 0 ' ( x ) < 0 and r 0 ' ( x ) e ( O , 1 ) • 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 impl ies that one candidate for an equiljbrium verification 
pol icy has the property that a taxpayer who reports greater income faces a 
lower probabil i ty of verifica tion. Since r-1• ( x) = 1 /r ' ( I ) ,  i t  fol lows that0 0 
r0' ( I) > 1 ;  that is, under-reported i ncome I - r0 ( I) declines with true
income. To see why this combi nation makes intuitive sense, note that 
p0' ( x) < 0 gives taxpayers an incentive to report higher income, while
r0' ( l) > 1 gives the IRS a greater incentive to  invest igate those who report
low income . Another ( possibly surprising) feature of this equilibrium is that 
verification and reporting pol icies do not depend on the precise form of the 
income dis tribution  function  F(.) , they only depend on its  support  [l.Il. 
II I. A Constru c tive Approach to Equil ibrium 
In this Sec t ion, we use a constructive approach to _characterize 
equi l i brium for cost funct ions which satisfy assumptions ( All. (A2) and (A3). 
Define x = I  - c' ( O) /t ( l + 11) . Next sol ve the ordinary differential
equation (7)  using p ( x) = O as a boundary condi tion. Denote this solution by 
po ( x) .
-1 I Next defi ne r0 ( x) = x + c' ( p0 ( x)) t ( l + 11) . Note that r-l is0 
differentiable. If p0 ( x) satisfies the fol lowing condi tion (B), then the pair
( p  .r
-l) satisfies equations (4), (5) and (6) ( with a strict inequality).0 0 
( B) -P0" ( x) c' ( p0 ( x))  + 2p0' ( x)t ( l + 11) < 0 for al l x { x.
-1 -1 Lemma 1 then implies that p0' ( x) < O and r0 '(x) e (0,1). Thus r0 (x) 
is invertible to obtai n x � r0 ( I). Define � E (-ro,x] such that� =  r0(1). 
Since r-1( .) is monotone increasing, if x exists, then it will be unique and
0 -
K < x; if no such value exists. define K � 
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Theorem 1. If p0(x) exists throughout [K.xl and sati
sfies condition (B). the n 
the following triple is a sequential equilibrium. The equilibrium 
verification and reporting policies are illustrated in Figure 1. 
(i) The equilibrium verification policy is 
r x 2 x p(x) = p0(x) x e [ K . xl c•-1(t(l + rr)(l - x)) x � K 
(ii) The equil:ibrium reporting policy r(I) is the unique value of x e [ K.x l 
such that 
I = r(l) + c'(p
0
(;(I)))/t(l + 11); 
that is, r(I) r0(I) as defined above. 
(iii) Finally, the equilibrium beliefs are 
T(X) 
r i -1 = l :0 (x) 
Proof-' Since r(I) 
x 2 x 
x ' IK.:Xl. 
x � K 
r0(I) = x and r(ll = r0(1) = K and since r0 is
invertible, c(x) satisfies the consistency requirement. 
dx) 
Given 'C( . ) , we next show that p(x) maximizes R(x,p;i:). For x 2 x, 
I. Then 
R (x,O ;d p t ( 1 + 11) (I - x ) - c ' ( O) < O for all x > x . 
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since R (x.O ;i:)p 0. Thus p(x) 0 for x 2 x. For x • [K,:XJ, �(x) r-l (x).0 
Then 
R (x,O;i:) p t(l + rr)(r
-1Cx) - x) - c'(O) = c'(p (x)) - c'( O). 0 0 
Since p0(x) = 0 and p0
'(x) < 0, p0(x) > O for all x < x. Thus c''(. ) > o 
implies that c'(p
0
(x)) - c'(O) O for all x < x. Thus p(x) is interior for 
x < x. Solving R
P
(x,p(x);i:) = 0 yields c'(p0 (x )) - c'(p(x)) = 0, or 
p(x) = p0(x) for x • !K.xl.
For x � K· �(x)
R (x,O;dp -
1. Then
t(l + rr)(l - K) - c'(O) > 0 
and R
P
(x,O ;i:) is decreasing in x. so R
P
(x,O ;i:) > 0 for all x i K· Solving 
R (x,p(x) ;d 
p 
t(l + 11)(1 - x) - c'(p(x)) 0 
yields p(x) c•-1(t(1 + 11)(1 - x)) for x i K· 
We now show that, given p( .) , r(I) maximizes N(I,x;p). Note that N is 
continuous in x because p( .) is continuous. Clearly any report of x > x is 
dominated by a report of x = x. This is because the taxpayer is not 
investigated at all, and thus pays a tax based only on reported income. For 
x < K· N is differentiable with 
Nx(I.x;p) p'(x) [-t(l + 11) (I - x)] + tnp(x) - t(l - p(x))
c•-1•(t(l + nl(l - x))[t (l + n)J2(I - x) + t np (x) - t(l - p(x)). 
- -1 -Since t(l + nl !I - x )  = c'(p{x)) and since c' '(c'(p(x))
can evaluate N at I to obtainx -
l / c " ( p ( x) ) , we 
N (l , x;p ) x - t(l + n ) c' ( p (xl l/c" (p( x ) ) + t(l + n ) p ( x )  - t > 0 
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by (A3). S ince Nx ( I , x ; p ) is increasing in I, Nx ( l , x ; p )  > 0 for x < K· for all 
I •  [I,IJ. Thus any report x < K is dominated by a report of x = K· Finally, 
for repor ts x c [K.xl , N is differentiable with 
llx(I. x;p ) = p0 ' (x ) [- t( l + n ) (l - x)] + tn p0( x )  - t (l - p0(x)). 
Note that Nx<I.K; p) = 0 because I - K = c' ( p0 (K ) ) /t ( l  + n) and because p0(x)
satisfies equation (7 ). Since Nx( l , x;p ) is increasing in I, Nx( l,K;p ) > 0 for 
all I > I. Similarly, N (I.x;p) = 0, and si nce N is increasing in I, - x x 
- - - - -
Nx(l, x;p) < O for all I < I. Thus r ( I )  • <K.xl for all I • <I.I) . Solving 
- - -
Nx (l , r (l ) ;p )  = O for r ( I )  yields 
r-m I - [p0 < ; <I>ltn - t (l - p0 (; <I>>J/p0• ( r ( I ) ) t ( 1 + n). 
Because p0( . )  satisfies equation (7), this reduces to
r(l) l - c'(p0(
;{I)))/t<l + n ) .
Q.E.D. 
Let T (l )  denote the expected tax paid by a taxp ay er with incom e l. 
Since on ly repo rts x c [r<I> , r ( l)] will be observed in equilibrium, it follows
that p(x) = p0(x) for all observed reports x. 
type l taxp ay er can be written as follows. 
Then the expected tax for a 
T(l) = p0(r0(I))[tl + tn (I - r0(l))] + (1 - p0(r0(l)))tr0(I). 
Corollary 1 .  For the sequential equil ibrium verification an d reportin g 
policies of Theorem l , dT ( l ) / dl > O and d (T ( ll/ll dl < 0 for all l • CI.ll. 
That is, the expected tax T(l) incr eases and the expected average tax rate 
T (l ) /I decreases with an increase in true income I. Thus the effective tax
schedule in the presence of incomplete information T ( I ) is regressive,
although the statutory tax schedule is linear. 
Proof. Recall that, by definition, p (x) satisfies equation (7) for all x.' 0 
dT(l)/dl = r0 • [ p0 • t( l  + n ) (l - r0) - tn p0 + t(l - p0)] + t(l + n )p 0 
r0' [p0'c' ( p0 ) - tnp0 + t (l - p0)] + t(l + n ) p0
t ( l  + n ) p0 ,
where p0 and p0' a re evaluated at r0(! ) , and r0 and r0• are evaluated at l. 
The second equality follows from equation ( 4) , and the third from equation 
( 7). Thus dT (Il/dl = t ( l  + n)p0 > 0 for all l • !I . Il . 
d ( T (ll/Il/dl [lt ( l  + n ) p0 - T ( lll/1
2
[tnp  - t(l - p ) J r l/120 0 0 
c'( p ) p  'r /12 < 0 0 0 0 
for all l c !I.I) , where the second equality follows by substitution of T(I) 
and the third follows from equation (7). 
14 
Q.E.D. 
To see tha t the singular so lution p = 1/(1 + n) and its implied
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reporting policy r(I) do not constitute a sequential equilibrium for cost 
functions which satisfy our domain restictions, recall that we have ruled out 
cost functions with the property that c'(O} = O .  This was done initially to 
ensure that equation (7) had a unique solution for the given boundary
condition; c'(O) = O is also ruled out by (A3). 
Solving equation ( 4) for the (inverse) reporting policy associated 
with the singular solution p(x) = 1 /(1 + n) yields 
- 1 
;: (x) - x c'(l /(1 + nll/t(l + n). 
Let a =  c'(l/(1 + nll/t(l + n). Then the putative equilibrium has 
r(I) =I - a for I£ c1.i1. and �(x) = x +a for x E 11 - a, I - a] , while
't(x )  = I for x � I - a and "t ( X) = I for x 2 I - a. To calculate the remainder
of the putative equilibrium, we compute the optimal verification policy p(x) 
given 't(x). 
Again let x =I - c'(Ol/t(l + n). Then for x >I - a, 't(x) =I. 
Since 
Rp(x,O;'tl t(l + n)(I - x )  - c'(O) < 0 
for all x > x, it follows that p(x) 0 for x 2 x. while p(x) solves
R P (x ,p(x) ;'tl t(l + n)(I - x) - c'(p(xl ) 0 
for x t [I - a;iJ. This set is non-empty because c''(,) > 0 implies that
x =I - c'(O)/t(l + n) >I - c'(l/(1 + n))/t(l + n) =I - a. Thus 
-1 - - -p( x ) = c' (t(l + n) (I - x ) ) for x £ CI - a,xJ. For x £ [l - a,I - a] , 
p( x ) = p (x ) = 1/(1 + rr). Finally, for x � 1 - a, :dxl =I. so p(x) solves 
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RP(x,p(x) ;i:) t(l + n)(!_ - x) - c'(p(x)) 0 
or p(x) c•-1(t(l + n)(!_ - x)) for x � I - a. 
To see that this combination d oes not constitute a sequential 
equilibrium for cost functions satisfying our domain restrictions, note that 
N(I,r(I) ;p) = I(l - t). while NO.i;p) = I - ti. Thus NO.i;p) > N(I,r(I) ;p) 
for all I e (I - c'(O)/t(l + nl,Il. Since we require c'(O) > 0, this set is 
non-empty. Thus a non-empty subset of taxpayer types would prefer to deviate 
from the "equilibrium" reporting policy r(I) and to convey a report which 
falls outside the interval of "equilibrium" reports [r(l) ,r(I)] =
U - a.I - al.
.IL An Example 
In this section, we compute the equilibrium verification and reporting 
functions p(x) and r(I) for a specific cost function. Assume that 
c(p) = -c ln(l - p ). This cost function satisfies (Al), (A2l and (A3). 
The upper limit x =I - c/t(l + n). To complete the solution we need 
only solve equation (7) using as a boundary condition that p
0
(xl = O and 
verify that p0 satisfies condition (B). 
Solving equation (7) with this boundary condition yields
p0(x) = 1 - n/[1 + n - exp(-(tn/c)(; - x))). 
The associated (inverse) reporting policy is 
_1 1 + n - exp{-(tn/c)(
; - xll 
r ( x )  = x + ------------------------ - • o (tn/c)(l + n) 
The lower limit x is defined implicitly by I = r-1(x). To see that x - - 0 - -
-1 - - -1 exists and is unique, note that r
0 
(x) = I. lim r0 
( x )  
x� _.., 
-1 -"', and r
0 
'(x) > 0 
for al l x ! x. Therefore there exists a unique value !. e ( -�.x> such that
1 r-1!x ) .0 -
It is tedious bu t straightforward to  check that 
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Proof� Corol lary 2 fol lows d irectly  from Theorem 1; an alternative direct
proof is contained in the Appendix. 
Y.c Di fferent Classes of Taxpayers 
18 
( t n )
2exp[- ( tn/c ) (; _ x ) }  We have seen i n  Sections III and IV that  when eq uilibrium verifica tion  -------- < 0 -p0" ( x ) c' ( p0 ( x ) ) + 2p0' ( x ) t ( l + n )
c[l + n - exp(- ( t n/cl (x  - x ) )]
for al l x ! x. That  is , condi tion ( BJ holds for al l x ! x. 
Corollary 2. Let c ( p )  = -c ln(l - p ) . Then the fol l owing triple is a
sequential equilibr ium . 
( i ) The verifica tion policy is given by 
( 0 I - x 2. x 
p ( x )  x e = l 1 - n/ [1 + n - exp!- ( tn/cl ( x - x ) J J
1 - c /t ( l + n ) (l - x )  X!l>. 
[!_, x J
(ii ) The reporting pol icy r ( l )  is the unique value of x � [l<_ , x l such that
1 + n - exp { - ( t n/c ) (; - r ( I ) ) )
I r < I )  + ( tn/c ) ( l + n ) I • [1, I];
that is, r ( l )  = r0 ( l ) .
(iii) The beliefs which assign a taxpayer type I t o  each observed report  x 
are given by 
't( x) 
r'l
l : ;'<•l
x 2. x 
x t [l<_, xl.
x � )<_ 
and repor ting pol icies are ( a t  least partial ly )  characterized by equa tion ( 7), 
then the extent of under-repor ting, I - r ( IJ, fal ls as true income I rises , 
and the verification  pol icy p ( x )  decl ines as repor ted income x rises . 
However, our anal ysis assumed that al l individuals  ( or  types of 
taxpayers ) were ex ante indistinguishable. If some o ther characteristic of 
individuals  is observable, then the IRS can, in some cases, condition  i ts 
verifica tion  pol icy upon this observable characteristic . Such characteristics 
may be relatively immutable ( e.g., sex or race ) , or subject to choice but 
largely determined by other considerations ( e . g., occupa tion or place of 
residence ) .  For instance. suppose that two individuals, one residing in  
Beverly Hil ls and the other in Death Val ley , report  the same taxable income x .  
Since the ex ante  distri bution  of i ncome opportunities is  likely to differ in 
a predictable way between these two locales, the equilibrium verifica tion  
policy ( and consequently the  equil ibrium repor ting pol icy ) should 
differentiate between these two identical repor ts . 
To model this. we can consider changing I. 1 or bo th. For simplicity,
suppose that I is unchanged. We wil l refer to taxpayers with di fferent val ues
of I as belonging t o  di fferent class�§ of taxpayers; � of taxpayers wi l l
then vary within each class. 
The fol lowing Lemma, which charac terizes the rela tive posi tions of the 
functions p ( x )  = p ( x) and p ( x )  = c•-1(t ( l + n ) (I - x ) J. wil l prove useful0 
later. 
Lemma 2 .  Suppose p
0
(xl is a solution to equation (7) which also satisfies
condition (Bl. Then 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
po(x)
po(x ) 
-1 c' (t(l + 11) (1 - x)) if x > K; 
c•- 1(t(l + 11) (1 - x)) if x = K: and
-1p 
0 
( x) < c • ( t ( 1 + II) ( 1 - x)) if x < K.
-1 
Proof. p(x) = p
0
(x) solves equation (1') with �(x) = r
0 
(x) and 
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p(xl = c•-1(t(l + nl!l - x)) solves (1') with �(x) = 1· The solution to (1') 
is increasing with inferred income �(x). Since r-1(x) is monotone increasing 
0 
-1 -1 - 1 with r
0
<Kl = 1· it follows that r
0
(x)>1 if x > K· r
0
(x) = 1  if x = K· and 
r-1<x> 
0 
1 if x < K ·  The claim follows.
Q.E.D. 
We can now consider the effect of increasing I upon the equilibrium 
verification and reporting policies. To do this, explicitly denote this 
dependence as follows: p(x;I) and r(I;I). A solution to equation ( 7) through 
0 at x = I  - c'(OJ/tCl + 11) is denoted p
0
(x;I). Since the solution to (7) is 
unique through any given value of p e [0,1), p
0
(x;I) and p
0
(x;I') cannot 
cross, for any I� I'. Since p
0
'(x;I) < 0, it follows that p
0
(x;I) is 
- - -
increasing in I. That is. if I' > I, then p
0
(x;I') > p
0
(x;I) for all x 
r• - c'COJ/tCl + 11). 
Recall that the inverse reporting policy 
-1 -r0 (x;I) x + c'(p0
(x;Ill/t(l + 11) 
is increasing; that is, r-1·(x;I) 0 
-1 - - -
defined by r0 (r(I;Il;I) - I �  0 .
> O. The reporting policy r(I;I)) is 
-1 - -1 -Since r
0 
'(x;I) > O and r
0 
(x;I) is 
- - -
increasing in I. it follows that r(I;I) is decreasing in I. Thus for any 
x' 
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given level of true income I. reported incom e falls as I rises; alternatively 
- - -
put, unreported income I - r(I;I) rises with I. Since K = r(l;I), we see that 
K also falls as I rises. Thus if I' > I. then �· K· 
Theorem 2 .  I f  the equilibrium verification and reporting policies are as 
described in Theorem 1. then for I' > I. 
(a) I - r(I;I') I - r(I;I) for I •  [1.Il; and 
(b) p(x;I') > p(x;I) for x • (�· , x ' ) ; the equilibrium verification 
policies coincide outside this interval. 
Figure 2 illustrates these results. 
Proof. We can partition the interval (-=,=) into five sets: (-=.�·] , CK'.�] , 
<K.X). [x,x') and [x',=l. For x • <-=.�·J. the optimal verification policies 
agree: - - - - -1 p(x;I') = p(x;I) = c' (t(l + 11)(1 - x)). For x • (;x_' . �J . p(x;I') = 
- - 1  - -P
0
(x;I') > c' (t(l + 11)(1 - x)) = p(x;I). The inequality follows from Lem m a
2 .  For x • (�.x), p(x;I') P
0
(x;I') > p
0
(x;I) = p(x;I). For x E [x.x'). 
p(x;I'l p
0
(x;I') > 0 = p(x;I). Finally, for x • [x' ,=), the policies again 
agree, with p(x;I') = p(x;!) = 0 . 
Q.E.D. 
That is, if two individuals have the same true income I, then that 
individual with the larger value of I will fail to report a greater amount of 
income than the one with the smaller value of I, and will accordingly find a 
greater amount of effort devoted to his investigation. Alternatively, the 
individual who resides in Beverly Hills, but reports the same income as a 
resident of Death Valley, will (be inferred to) have concealed more income, 
and is more likely to be investigated. than his counterpart who resides in 
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Death Val ley. 
.YJ_,_ Costs of Verification
One important policy question in the area of tax compliance is: what 
is the impact of an increased capacity to  verify income upon equilibrium 
verifica tion and report ing policies? One could imagine such an increased 
capacity coming about through technical progress which uniformly lowers the 
cost of income verifica tion, or through simpl ification  of the tax form itsel f .  
To model this question formal ly, let k ( p )  represent another cost 
function which satisfies ( Al ) - ( A3 ) ,  with the property that k' ( p )  < c' ( p )  for
al l p e [0,1 ) .  Since k ( O )  = c ( O )  = 0, it fol lows that k ( p )  < c (p )  for al l
p e ( 0,1]. 
Let p ( x; kl and p ( x; c )  denote equilibrium verifica tion policies under 
the cost functions k ( . ) and c (  . )  , respectively .  Let xk = I  - k' ( OJ /t ( l  + n )
and x c I - c' ( O ) /t ( l + n); clearly, ik > i0 Let p0 ( x;k )  and p0 (x; c )  denote
the solutions to  equa tions (7 ) and ( 7' )  below, where ( 7 )  is restated here for 
easy reference. 
- p' ( x ) c' ( p ( x ) ) + tnp ( x )  - t ( l  - p (x ) ) 0 ( 7 )  
-p' ( x ) k' ( p ( x ) )  + tnp ( x )  - t ( l - p ( x ) ) o. ( 7 .) 
Lemma 1� Suppose that k(.) and c (  . )  are two cost func tions satisfying ( Al )-
(A3 ) with k' (p)  < c' ( p )  for al l p E [0,1 ), and  that p0(x; c )  and  p0 ( x; k )  are
solutions of equations (7) and (7') , respectively. which also satisfy
condition  (8). Then p0 ( x; k )  p0 (x; c )  for al l x � x0•
Proo__[,_ Since p0'(x;k) < 0, p0
(xk;k) 
- -
o and x0 xk' i t  follows that
P01x0;k) > 0 p0(xc;c). I n  order for p0(x;k) � p0 ( x; c )  a t  some x < xc' i t
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must  be that p0 ( x; c )  crosses p0 ( x; k )  from belgi,• at some point  x0• At this
point, i t  must be that p0' ( x; c )  � p0' ( x; k )  ( see Figure 3 ) . From equa tions (7) 
and ( 7 '), we see that at a crossing point ( x0, p0 ) , i t  must be that
-p0' ( x0; c ) c' ( p0 ) = -p0' ( x0; k ) k' ( p0 ) .  Since c' ( p )  > k' ( p )  for al l p, it
follows  that - p0' ( x; c )  < -p0' ( x; k ) ;  that is, p0' ( x; c )  > p0' ( x;k ) .  But this is
a contradiction .  Thus p0 ( x; k )  > p0 ( x; c )  for al l x � x0.
Q.E.D. 
Unfortuna tely, we canno t  determine unambiguously the impact of lower 
verifica tion costs upon the equil ibrium reporting pol icy r ( I ) . To see why, 
note that 
r-1 ( x; c )  0 x + c' ( p0 ( x; cll /t ( l + n )
while 
-1 I r0 ( x; k )  = x + k'(p0 ( x; k ) ) t ( l + n ) .
Switching from the cost function c(, ) to the lower cost function k(.) has two
effec ts; first, it lowers r-l for the same value of p ;  however, it0 
simul taneously raises the equilibrium value of p, thus raising r�
1 The net
resul t of these two conflicting effects  is generally ambiguous . As a 
consequence, we canno t  order the lower limits  Kk and Xe• which are defined
-1 -1 implicitly  by the equa tions I =  r0 <xk; k )  and I =  r0 <x0; c ) , respectively.
Despite this ambiguity, it is possible to make the fol lowing compa rison 
between p ( x; k )  and p ( x; c ) . 
Theorem 3. Suppose that k(.) and c (  . ) are two cost  functions satisfying
(Al ) - ( A3 ) ,  with k'(p ) < c' ( p )  for all p t [ 0 ,1 ), and suppose that p0 (x; c )  and
p0 ( x;k ) are solutions of ( 7) and (7'), respectively. which also satisfy
- -
condition (Bl. Then p ( x; kl > p ( x; c )  for al l x. That  is, i f  there is a
uniform decrease in the marginal cost of verifica tion, then greater effort 
will  be devoted to verifica tion. 
Proof. For x e [xk.�l. the two ver ifica tion pol icies coincide, with 
- -
p ( x;k ) = p ( x;c ) = O . For x e [xc.xk) ,  p ( x; k )  > 0 = p ( x;c ) . For 
x e ( max {i!_k,i!_cl .�c ) ,  p ( x; k )
x • ( -=, min{i!_k, i!_c]J, p ( x; k )
p0 (x; k )  > p0 ( x; c )  = p ( x; c )  b y  Lemma 3. 
k'-l ( t ( l  + 11)(1 - x ) ) > 
For 
c•-1 ( t ( l + nl (l - xll = � ( x; c ) . Final ly, we need to consider val ues of
x £ ( min{l!.it·l'cl.max{J!.k, J\.c}]. If Kk 2. Kc• then for x e ( ?!_c, J>.kl.
- -1 -p ( x;k) = k' ( t ( l + n)(l - x) ) 2 p0 (x; k )  > p0 (x; c )  = p ( x;c ) .  The first
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inequality fol lows from Lemma 2, and the second inequality  fol lows  from Lemma 
3. If Kk < Kc• then for x e ( i!_k, i!_cl we have
p ( x;k ) = p ( x; k )  > k'-l ( t (l + n)(l - x ) ) > c•-1 ( t ( l + 11)(1 - x ) J  0 - - p ( x;c ) .
The first inequa l i ty fol lows from Lemma 2, and the second from the assumption 
that k'Cp ) < c' ( p )  for al l p e [0.1]. Thus p ( x; k ) > p ( x; c )  for al l x. 
Q . E. D .  
VII. Risk-Averse TaxJ2j!.Yers 
Let us now reconsider the anal ysis of Section  II under the assumption 
that taxpayers are risk-averse . Let u ( I )  denote the uti l i ty the taxpayer 
receives from income I, and assume that  u' ( I )  > 0 and u' '(!) 0 for al l I.
Then the taxpayer's expected util ity when true income is I, he repor ts x, and 
is faced with the verifica tion  policy p ( . ) ,  is 
U(I ,x; p) p ( x ) u ( I  - tI - tn ( l  - x)) + (1 - p ( x ) ) u ( I  - tx) .
The analogs of equati0ns 12) and 131 are: 
and 
p ' ( x l [ u ( z1 ) - u ( z2 l J + p ( x l u • ( z1 l t 11 - t (1 - p ( x ) ) u • ( z2 )
p " ( x ) [ u ( z1 ) - u ( z2 ) ] + 2 p' ( x )[ u ' ( z1 ) t 11 + u ' ( z2 ) t J
+ p ( x ) u" ( z1 ) ( t11J
2 + ( 1  - p ( x ) ) u" ( z2it
2 
S. O 
where z1 = I - tI - t11 ( I  - xl and z2 = I - tx.
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0 (1 0)  
( 1 1) 
If ( T0, p0, r0) are part of a sequential equilibrium, and these policies 
sa tisfy equations ( 1' ) ,  ( 10 )  and ( 11) simul taneously, then the analysis of 
Lemma 1 can be repeated ( under one additional assumption )  to obtain the 
fol lowing resul t. 
Lemma 4 .  I f  the inequa l i ty ( 11) i s  strict. and 1 - t ( l + n )  � 0, then
po' ( x )  
-1 0 and r 0 ' ( x )  e ( 0, 1 )  • 
Proof. Subst i tuting I r-1( x )  and T ( x )  0 0 
-1 r0 ( x )  into equations (1 ') and
( 10 )  yields 
t ( l  + n ) (r-1 ( x )  - xl - c' ( p  )0 0 0 
P0' ( x ) [u ( z1) - u<z2JJ + p0 ( x ) u' ( z1J t n  - t ( l - p0 ( xllu'Cz2l
-1 -1 -1 where z1 = r0 ( x ) ( l  - t) - tn (r0 ( x )  - xl and z2 = r0 
( x )  - tx.
0, 
Equa tions ( 12)  and ( 13 )  mus t  hold in a neighborhood of x when 
( 12) 
( 13) 
P0 ( x )  e ( 0,1 ) .  Differentiating with respect to x and col lecting terms y ields 
t ( I  + n) ( r-1 '(x)  - 1) 0 c"(po)po'(x) ( 14) 
p0 " ( x )[u ( z1> - u ( z2>J + 
2p0' ( x ) [u' ( z1> tn + tu'tz2>J
- 2 2 
+ p0 ( x ) u "tz1 ) ( tn ) + t ( 1 - p0 ( x ) ) u"tz2>
- t ( l + n ) ) - u'tz2ll 
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r�1 ' ( x) { p0' ( x ) [u' ( ;:1 ) ( t
+ p0 ( x ) u"tz1> tn ( l - t ( l + n ) )  - t ( l - p0 ( x) ) u' ' ( ;:2> } ( 15 ) 
If 1 - t ( l + n )  i 0, then the expression u' ( z1 ) ( 1 - t ( l + n ) ) - u'tz2> < 0 ,
and the expression p0 ( x ) u''tz1ltn ( l 
-1 From (1 4), either ( i) r0 ' ( x) - 1 > 
- t ( l + n ) ) - t ( l -
o and p0' ( x) > O or 
p0 ( x ) ) u"tz2> > o. 
( i i) r�1• ( x) - 1 < O 
and p0 ' ( x) < O. Since the left-hand side of equation  ( 15 )  is negative when 
inequality ( 11)  is strict, ei ther (iii) r�1• ( x )  < O and p0' ( x) > o, or ( iv) 
-1 r0 ' ( x) > 0 and the bracketed term on the righ t-hand side of ( 15 )  > O .
Conditions ( i) and ( iii) are contradictory, so  conditions ( i i) and  ( iv) must 
hold. That is , p ' ( x) < O and r-l ' ( x) e ( 0,1 ) .0 0 
O.E.D. 
The pa rametric restric tion 1 - t ( l + n )  � O is sufficient, but not 
necessary, for this proposi tion to be true ( recal l that risk neutral ity on  the
part of the taxpayer was sufficient, without any additional parametric 
assumpt ions). One way to interpret this restriction is as fol lows: if not 
detected, a dol lar of unreported income is worth $1; if detected , the tax plus 
penalty  paid on a dol lar of unrepor ted income is $t ( l + n ) . Thus the
assumption that 1 - t ( l + n) i O means that the taxpayer's marginal ( mo ney) 
gain to under-reporti ng if he goes undetec ted is at least wiped out by his 
marginal loss if detected. 
VIII_, Conclusions 
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This paper presents a simple model of tax compliance as a game of 
incomplete information . The sequence of moves has the taxpayer first 
reporting his income, and the I R S  subsequently  act i ng optimally on the basis 
of this report. Thus the I R S  is not permit ted to  make non-credible th reats 
about i ts verification  pol icy . We find that an equilibrium verifica tion 
pol icy involves devoti ng greater resources to verification for those taxpayers 
reporting lower levels of income. The equil i brium reporting rule for 
taxpayers implies that taxpayers with greater income under-report less than 
those with lower i ncome. We also find that al though the statutory form of the 
tax schedule is linear, the effect!�� tax schedule under incomplete 
information is regressive in the sense that the expected average tax rate 
decl ines as income rises . 
I t  is i mportant to emphasize that the aforementioned results are 
derived by considering only  a single class of taxpayers; that is, under the 
assumption that one can not distinguish among taxpayers ex ante on the basis of 
s·ome other observable  characteristic . When an observable characteristic  which 
is related to ex ante opportunities for high income is availabl e ,  we find that 
those classes of taxpayers with greater income opportunities ( in terms of 
maximum possible income) fail to report a greater amount of their income and 
face harsher verification pol icies .  That is, if two taxpayers have the same 
true income, then the one who ex ante enjoyed a bet ter range of income 
opportunities wil l report less income; for any two taxpayers who repor t  the 
same level of income, more effort wil l be devo ted to income verification for 
the taxpayer who ex ante enjoyed a better range of income opportunities. 
A uniform decrease in the marginal cost of verification leads to an
increase in efforts devoted to verification, but the net effect of this change 
on equilibrium compliance is ambiguous.
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These res ults have been der ived u nd er fair l y  s tr inge n t  restr i c t i o ns o n  
the cos t funct io n c(  . ) ; i n  part i c u l ar .  we ass umed t h a t  (Al ) , ( A2 ) a n d  (A3 ) 
he ld. The res tr i cti o n  ( A2 )  is l arge l y  for si mpl i c ity; i ts e limi n a ti o n  would 
require add it iona l  analys i s  of the Kuhn-Tu cker cond i ti o ns (1), which wou l d
ind i c a t e  w hen and i f  t h e  opt i mal repor t i ng p o l i c y  reaches t h e  bound ary 
p ( x )  = 1. This wou ld ad d anot her bran ch t o  the des cri p ti o n  of' p (x ) , bu t is 
n ot l i ke l y  to cause ad d i t i on a l  comp l ica t i ons . Ass ump t i o ns ( Al ) and ( A3 )  are 
object i ona b l e  in tha t  they j oi n t l y  ru l e  o u t  the c l ass of' cos t  func t i o ns in 
w hich c'(O) = 0 ,  and po s s i b l y  other na t ural c l asse s  of cos t  func t i o ns . The
former ass umpt i o n  was us e d  to asser t the uniqueness of p0 ( . )  t hrough the giv e n  
boundary cond i t i o n , and again i n  the proof t h a t  t h e  singu lar s o l u ti o n  p(x ) 
does not gener a t e  a sequential equ i l i br i um . The l a t ter was use d in the proof 
that p0 ( x )  does ge nerate a seq u e n tial equi l ibr i um . A desirable ex t e nsio n  of 
th is work would i n c l ude the e l i mi na t i o n  of these r e s tr i c ti o ns. A l t h ough t h is 
might result in mu l tip l e  s o l utio ns to equa t i o n  (7) , for p ar ti cu l ar cas es o ne 
can al ways dire c t l y  ver i fy or rej e c t  t h e s e  s o l u t i o ns as seque ntial eq ui l i bria. 
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A PPENDI X 
I n  t h i s  appendix . we v e r i fy Corol lary 2 d i rec tl y .  
Proo f .  Recal l th a t  r ( I )  = r0 ( I ) ;  thus r ( ! )  = � by d e f i ni ti o n .  
- - - - - 1 -i nver t i b l e  on [� . x ] , r ( I )  = x i f  and only if r0 (x ) = I . 
_ 1  l + n - exp { - ( t n /c ) (x - x > J r ( x ) = x + --- - - - - - - -----0 ( t n/c ) ( l + n )  f (x ) . 
Since r- l i s0 
Eva l ua t i ng a t  x impl ies t h a t  r- 1 <x > = I . The inversion of r- l is j u s t i fied 0 0 
3 1  
- 1  since r 0 ' ( x )  f ' ( x )  > 0 for al l x < x . Thus �(x ) s a t i sfies the consi s tency
requi remen t .  
Next we show th a t  g i v e n �( . ) , p(x ) max imizes R (x , p ; � ) . 
For x £ [x , m) , ;(x) = i ,  and
R (x , p ; � )  p [ tI + t n (I - x ) ]  + ( 1  - p ) tx - c l n ( l - p ) . 
D i f ferent i a t i ng w i th res p e c t  to p and eval ua t i ng a t  p 
R
P
(x , O ; d t ( l + n ) (I - x )  - c � 0 
for al l x 2 x ,  so p ( x )  = O is o p t i ma l  for x 2 x . 
- - - 1  F o r  x £ [� . x i , d x )  = r 0 ( x ) a n d
O i mp l ies that 
R (x , p ; d p [ t r�1 ( x )  + n t (r�1 ( x ) - x ) ] + ( 1  - p ) tx - c l n ( l - p ) .
D i f fere n t i a t i o n  and eval ua t i o n  a t  p O i mp l ie s  that
R ( x , O ; d p 
t ( l  + n ) (r- 1 (x ) - x )  - c 0 
( 1 /n ) [ l + n - exp { - t n (X - x) J )  - c > 0 
3 2  
for al l x £ [;! , X ) . Thus p ( x )  t ( 0 , 1 )  for x e [ ;! , X ) . Sol v i ng  R
P
( x , p (x ) ; i:)  
for p ( x )  yields
p (x )  1 - n / [ 1 + 11 - exp { - ( t n /c l (; - x ) J ] .
For x � K ·  � (x ) = 1 .  
argument , and s i n c e  
S i n c e  R ( � ( I )  , 0 ; � )  > 0 from the previousp -
R ( x . O ; t"l p t (  1 + 11 )  ( 1  - x )  - c
is de creasi ng in  x ,  i t  fol lows that \ C x , O ; d  > 0 for al l x < K = r (I_ ) . Thus
p ( x )  is interior . Sol v i ng R
P
(x , p (x ) ; � )  = 0 yi e l d s
p ( x )  = 1 - c /t < l  + 11 ) ( 1 - x ) . for x � K ·  
Note that p (x ) i s  a conti nuous fun c t i o n  of x .  
0 
Finally , i t  mus t  be shown t h a t  r ( l )  is be s t  aga i n st p (x ) . N ( I , x ; p )  is
a conti nuous func t i o n  of x because p (x )  i s  co n t i nuo u s . I t  is c l early 
subopt imal for any type I to report  x > x ;  any s u c h  repo r t  i s  d om ina ted by a 
repor t of x .  Simil arl y ,  any report  of x < K is dom inated by a repor t of K ·
To see this , note that for x < K ·  N ( I . x ; p )  i s  di ffe r e n t i a b l e  w i t h
ll ( I , x ; p ) x [ 1 / 1 1  - x ) J  [ c ( l - x l / ( !_ - x )  + t n (!_ - x )  - c l .
N ( I , x ; p ) = tn > 0 for al l  x < x .  S i n c e  N i s  i ncr easi ng in I .  N ( I , x ; p) > 0 x - - x x 
for al l x < K and al l I e 11 .I l . Thus a repor t of K is preferred to a ny 
repor t x < K ·  Final ly , for x • ( !!_ ,  x )  , 
N
x ( I
. x ; p ) = 1 -�� -�x� �� ��
n/
c:_�< � _
-
::__
x
�� - - / X l ( t 11/c ) ( �- � -�� ���1'._� - - - 1 { . 
1 + 11 - exp [ - ( t n /c ) ( x  - x ) }  \ 1 + 11 - exp [ - ( t n/c ) ( x  - x ) } \ 
3 3  
Nx ( I , x ; p )  < 0 ,  except for I I , in wh ich ca se Nx ( I , x ; p )  = 0 by the defini t i o n
- -
of x .  Simil arl y ,  Nx ( l , K ; p ) 0 excep t  when I = 1 .  in which case Nx ( l . K ; p ) = 0 
- -
by the de f ini t i o n  of 1' ·  Thus r ( I ) e ( K . X l  for each I £ ( !_ , ! ) . Sol ving 
Nx ( I , r ( I ) ; p )  = 0 for r ( l ) impl i e s  t h a t  x = r ( I ) is the unique value of 
x e ( -m , x ] such that
I - r ( I )  [ 1  + n - exp { - ( t n/c ) (; - � ( I ) J J J / ( tn/c ) ( l + n ) . 
Q.E.D . 
